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On What A "Private Attorney
General" Is-And Why It Matters
William B. Rubenstein

57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004)

Although the phrase "private attorney general" is commonly
The
employed in American law, its meaning remains elusive.
concept generally serves as a placeholder for any person who mixes
public and private features in the adjudicative arena. Yet there are
so many players who mix public and private functions in so many
different ways that the idea holds the place for a motley cast of
disparate characters. My goal in this Article is to map these
mixes-to distill from the singular private attorney general concept
a range of distinct private attorneys general-andthen to show why
this new taxonomy is a helpful heuristic device. Specifically, I argue
that the new taxonomy illuminates a weakness in the governing
model of the class case. Scholars loosely associated with the law
and economics movement have helpfully described class action
lawsuits as presenting a classic agency problem: class action
attorneys (agents) pursue the interests of their class member clients
(principals) with little oversight or control. Consequently, class
action scholarship has focused on identifying ways to better align
the interests of the agents with those of their principals. This
obsession with agent incentives assumed, without significant
investigation, that there existed a stable group of principals with
My typology demonstrates that
easily-identifiable interests.
different types of private attorneys general serve different types of
principals, each of which combine public and private interests in
different ways. If the goal of class action law is to align the
attorneys' interests with those of their clients, it is necessary to
identify clearly the precise nature of these underlying principals.
That is the contributionof this piece.

